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Statutory Rape: A Crime of Violence for
Purposes of Immigrant Deportation?
Shani Fregiat

On November 4, 1994 an eighteen-year-old boy and his fifteen-year-old girlfriend of nearly two months engaged in sexual
intercourse.' The couple undressed themselves and the young
man wore a condom. 2 The sexual act was factually consensual,
yet the act fit within the defined terms of statutory rape pursuant to Wisconsin statute § 948.02(2) which makes it a class C
felony for someone to have sexual intercourse with a person who
has not attained the age of sixteen years. 3 On May 4, 1995 the
young man was sentenced to five years imprisonment upon a
conviction of statutory rape. 4 On June 18, 1996 the same young
man was released on parole only to be served an order from Immigration and Naturalization Services ("INS") stating that his
conviction of statutory rape was classified as a crime of violence
making him deportable under the Immigration and Nationality
Act ("INA") §241(a)(2)(A)(iii).6
Statutory rape is defined as: "unlawful sexual intercourse
with a person under the age of consent (as defined by statute),
'6
regardless of whether it is against that person's will or not."
Generally, only an adult may be convicted of this crime although
in some states the difference in the age of the victim and the
perpetrator is the deciding factor. 7 Because statutory rape is
solely contingent upon the victim being under the age of consent,
t B.A. 2005, Stanford University; J.D. Candidate 2008, University of Chicago.
1 Xiong v INS, 173 F3d 601, 603 (7th Cir 1999).
2 Id.
3 Wis Stat § 948.02(2) (West 2006).
4 Xiong, 173 F3d at 603.
5 Id.
6 Black's Law Dictionary 1288 (West 8th ed 2004). See, for example, Cal Penal Code
§ 261.5(a)-(c) (West 2000); RI Gen Laws § 11-37-6 (2005); Tex Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1)
(2001) (no coercion requirement mentioned in statutes for statutory rape).
7 See, for example, Cal Pen Code § 261.5(a)-(c) (West 2000) (noting that difference in
age between the victim and the perpetrator can determine whether the crime is punished
as a misdemeanor or felony).
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whether the perpetrator uses force or the threat of force is irrelevant, making statutory rape a strict liability crime.8 It is also
irrelevant in assessing the crime of statutory rape whether the
victim and the perpetrator have factually consented to engage in
sexual conduct because the underage victim is unable to give legal consent.
Title 8 of the United States Code, section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii),
states that "any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at
any time after admission is deportable." The INA defines an "aggravated felony" as "the murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor, [or a] crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18,
United States Code, but not including a purely political offense)
for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year."9 Congress described a crime of violence in title 18 USC § 16 as
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a
felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk
that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. 10
Currently the circuits are split on whether statutory rape is
a crime that inherently has the necessary component, "substantial risk of the use of physical force," that would qualify it as a
crime of violence according to the INA and 18 USC § 16. Two
primary viewpoints have emerged. The first focuses on the intrinsic nature of the offense rather than on the factual circumstances surrounding any particular violation. This has been
termed the "categorical approach"" in determining whether an
offense is a crime of violence within the meaning of § 16(b). The
second is "modified categorical analysis" which can be characterized as a case-by-case, fact-based approach.

8 Black's Law Dictionary 1288 (8th ed 2004). See, for example, Virginia v Black, 538
US 343, 397 (2003) (Thomas dissenting) (stating "a person can be arrested, prosecuted,
and convicted for having sex with a minor, without the government ever producing any
evidence, let alone proving beyond a reasonable doubt, that a minor did not consent);
Owens v State, 724 A2d 43, 45 (Md 1999), cert denied, (holding statutory rape is a strict
liability crime where mistake of age is not a defense to the crime).
9 8 USC § 1101(a)(43)(A),(F).
10 18 USC § 16.
11 Aguiar v Gonzales, 438 F3d 86, 89 (1st Cir 2006).
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The majority of the circuits have turned to the inherent risk
of physical force standard. Most circuits employing this analysis
assert that a categorical approach to the crime of statutory rape
requires it be viewed as a crime of violence, explaining that there
is always a substantial risk that force could be used when an
adult attempts to have sexual intercourse with a minor. 12 The
Ninth Circuit has used the categorical approach to come to the
alternative conclusion that there is not necessarily an inherent
risk that physical force will be used in the crime of statutory
rape. 13
The modified categorical approach has been employed by the
Seventh Circuit. This standard takes into consideration the age
of the victim, the age difference between the victim and the perpetrator, and the nature of the sexual activity. 14 This approach
rejects the majority view that a risk of physical force is inherent
in the crime of statutory rape and suggests that an individualized determination should be made based upon the unique facts
of each case.
Statutory rape is defined by state statute and thus can differ
greatly between states. Some of the most noticeable differences
are: the defined age of consent and of a minor, what level of offense statutory rape falls under (for example felony or misdemeanor), whether the state characterizes the offense by its own
statutory definition as a "crime of violence," and what gender can
commit the offense. For example, in California the age of consent
is eighteen 15 and a minor can be charged with statutory rape for
engaging in sexual intercourse with another minor. 16 California
law also provides that sexual intercourse with a minor not more
12 See id at 86; Chery v Ashcroft, 347 F3d 404, 407 (2d Cir 2003) ("This Court follows
what has been termed a 'categorical approach' to determine whether an offense is a crime
of violence within the meaning of § 16(b)."). Accord United States v Velasquez-Overa, 100
F3d 418, 420 (5th Cir 1996); Ramsey v INS, 55 F3d 580, 583 (11th Cir 1995); United
States v Bauer, 990 F2d 373, 375 (8th Cir 1993); United States v Reyes-Castro, 13 F3d
377, 379 (10th Cir 1993).
13 See Valencia v Gonzales, 439 F3d 1046, 1052-53 (9th Cir 2006) ("[A] violation of
section 261.5(c) does not, 'by its nature, involven a substantial risk that [violent] physical
force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense.' Accordingly, a violation of 261.5(c) is not categorically a crime of violence
under § 16(b).") (citations omitted).
14 See Xiong, 173 F3d at 607.
15 Cal Pen Code § 261.5 (West 2000).
16 Michael M. v Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 US 464, 474 (1981) (holding
California statutory rape laws did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by punishing
only the male when both parties were under the age of 18). The Court reasoned that the
California statute reasonably reflects the fact that the consequences of sexual intercourse
and pregnancy fall more heavily on the female than on the male. Id at 476.

542

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2007:

than three years younger than the perpetrator is a misdemeanor
whereas intercourse with a minor who is more than three years
younger can be classified as a misdemeanor or a felony. 17 Iowa
law specifies that engaging in sexual acts with a person twelve or
thirteen years old is against the law, but that sexual acts with a
person fourteen or fifteen years old are also unlawful if other factors are present (for example, if the perpetrator and the victim
are members of the same household).s Utah law describes a minor as a "child," meaning a person under the age of fourteen. 19
Florida law outlines statutory rape offenses generally in a statute describing lewd or lascivious offenses committed upon a per20
son less than sixteen years old.
This comment will suggest a solution for the circuit split
that addresses both state statutory rape statutes and 18 USC
§ 16. Unlike the other circuits employing categorical analysis,
the Ninth Circuit has analyzed the issue by taking into account
all relevant behavior. This comment will suggest that when analyzing all behavior possible under most statutory rape statutes,
categorically the statutes cannot be held to raise a substantial
risk that physical force will be used. Part I will look at the court
decisions that have created the circuit split. Part II will evaluate
the case law and conclude that portions of the Seventh Circuit's
analysis and the Ninth Circuit's analysis would provide the best
starting point for deciding whether statutory rape as defined by
each individual state statute amounts to a crime of violence.
I. BACKGROUND
The First, Second, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have decided that sexual contact between a minor and an
adult amounts to a "crime of violence." 21 These circuits have held
that even when the conduct is factually consensual there always
exist a substantial risk that physical force could be used between
a minor and a person of age. In addition these courts have upheld decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") which
finds immigrants deportable as aggravated felons pursuant to
INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) due to their statutory rape convictions.

17 Cal Pen Code § 261.5(b),(c) (West 2000).
18 Iowa Code Ann § 709.4(2)(b),(c)(1) (West 2006).

19 Utah Code Ann § 76-5-404.1(1) (West 2006).
20 Fla Stat § 800.04 (West 2006).
21 See cases cited in note 12.
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The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have taken the view that
there are certain circumstances which do not compel the conclusion that a substantial risk of physical force is present and thus
the statutory rape charge does not automatically meet the requirements of a § 16(b) crime of violence. 22 Because of the broad
scope of § 16(b) and the variation in state statutes it is not at all
obvious whether statutory rape should be viewed as a crime of
violence or not.
A.

Supreme Court Ruling on Crime of Violence

Title 18 USC § 16 was enacted as part of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984.23 The United States Supreme Court
has stated that this section of the act reformed the federal criminal code and has been incorporated into a variety of statutory
provisions. 24 The Supreme Court has not yet defined the exact
scope of the definition of crime of violence within the meaning of
an aggravated felony for purposes of the INA. The court has
however noted in INS v St Cyr,25 that the § 16(b) definition is
broad. 2 6 In that case the court discussed the practical importance
of section 212 of the INA which provides relief through the Attorney General's discretion to waive deportation of criminal immigrants charged with deportable offenses.2 7 The court explained
that the expansive definition provided by 18 USC § 16 increases
the category of aggravated felonies, which enlarges the descrip28
tion of deportable offenses.
In Leocal v Ashcroft,29 the Supreme Court stated that Congress has given different definitions to the term "crime of violence" in different contexts. 30 In Leocal, the Court decided that
22 Consider Valencia v Gonzales, 439 F3d 1046, 1052-53 (9th Cir 2006); Xiong v INS,
173 F3d 601, 607 (7th Cir 1999).
23 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1976.
24 Leocal v Ascroft, 543 US 1, 6 (2004) (noting that Congress employed the term
"crime of violence" throughout the act to define elements of offenses).
25 533 US 289 (2001).
26 Id at 296 n 4.
27 Id at 295 (stating that the extension of § 212 relief to the deportation context has
had great practical importance because deportable offenses have historically been defined
broadly).
28 Id (noting that Congress defined "aggravated felony" to include numerous offenses
without regard to how long ago they were committed).
29 543 US 1 (2004).
30 Id at 10, quoting United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual
(USSG) § 4B1.2(a)(2) (Nov 2003) (A "crime of violence" is "conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.").
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driving under the influence was not a crime of violence, noting in
a footnote that "§ 16(b) plainly does not encompass all offenses
which create a 'substantial risk' that injury will result from a
person's conduct. The 'substantial risk' in § 16 (b) relates to the
use of force, not to the possible effect of a person's conduct." 31 The
court did say that § 16(b) "requires us to look to the elements and
the nature of the conviction, rather than to the particular
facts."

32

In its analysis, the Court gave two examples that may shed
light on how statutory rape should be interpreted in light of
§ 16(b). The court explained a burglary would be covered under
§ 16(b) because burglary, by its nature, involves a substantial
risk that the burglar will use force against a victim in completing
the crime. 3 3 Driving under the influence on the other hand does
not include the mens rea element necessary for § 16(b) crime of
violence status when merely accidental or negligent conduct is
involved. 34 Thus, the court distinguishes risk of injury from risk
of use of physical force.
B.

Categorical Approach

The majority of circuits hold that statutory rape involves an
inherent risk of physical force. 35 Courts offer a variety of rationales for this standard. In Chery v Ashcroft, 36 a thirty-three-yearold man was convicted under Connecticut state law 37 of the
statutory rape of a fourteen-year-old girl. 38 The court reasoned
that "Chery was removable because his sexual assault conviction
constituted an aggravated felony (more specifically, a 'crime of
violence') under 8 USC § 1101(a)(43)(F)."39 The court also concluded that
although a conviction may be obtained under § 53a-71 for
consensual sexual intercourse and force may not be present in all circumstances, the risk of the use of force is inherent in each of the offenses set forth in the statute. "It
31 Leocal, 543 US at 10 n 7.
32 Id at 7.

33 Id at 10.
34 Id at 12.

35
36
37
38
39

See cases cited in note 21.
347 F3d 404 (2d Cir 2003).
Conn Gen Stat Ann § 53a-71 (statute defining sexual assault in the second degree).
347 F3d at 404.
Id at 406.
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matters not one whit whether the risk ultimately causes
40
actual harm."
The Second and Eleventh Circuits have determined that the
felony of statutory rape committed under Connecticut and Florida State law, respectively, are crimes of violence even though
the statutes allow for conviction where no force is used. 41 Looking
to the intrinsic nature of the crime the courts reasoned that there
is always a risk that force could have been used to carry out the
crime if necessary. The case that developed the intrinsic nature
analysis, Dalton v Ashcroft, 42 noted that "[u]nder the language of
the statute, a §16(b) 'crime of violence' is analyzed 'by its na43
ture."'
1. Legal versus factual determination.
Continuing in the categorical approach, the Eighth Circuit
has held that "[w]hether statutory rape is a violent crime is a
legal, rather than factual, determination." 44 This suggests that
the court should ignore the facts of a specific case and decide the
question of whether a crime of violence has been committed upon
finding that the risk of violence is present in the statutory definition of the crime. 45 The court also concluded that the "term 'by its
nature' would be rendered superfluous if the sentencing courts
were saddled with the task of examining each individual offense." 46 In United States v Bauer,47 the term crime of violence
was scrutinized for purposes of sentencing, but the court's focus
on the risk of physical force being present provides useful analysis and suggests that they would find statutory rape a crime of
violence for deportation purposes which meet the same defini48
tion.
40 Id at 408, quoting United States v Rodriguez, 979 F2d 138, 141 (8th Cir 1992). See
also Ramsey v INS, 55 F3d 580, 583 (11th Cir 1995) (court admitting that they only look
at the statutory definition of the crime of conviction and not the circumstances of a particular offense).
41 Chery, 347 F3d at 408; Ramsey, 55 F3d at 583.
42 257 F3d 200 (2d Cir 2001).
43 Id at 204.

44 United States v Bauer, 990 F2d 373, 374 (8th Cir 1993).
45 Id at 375.
46 Id. See also Taylor v United States, 495 US 575, 599 (1990), vacating and remanding 864 F2d 625 (8th Cir 1989) ('Congress did not wish to specify an exact formulation
that an offense must meet in order to count as 'burglary' for enhancement purposes.").
47 990 F2d 373 (8th Cir 1993).
48 Id at 375.
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In United States v Reyes-Castro,49 the Tenth Circuit agreed
"with the Eighth Circuit that a court must only look to the statutory definition, not the underlying circumstances of the crime."50
The Tenth Circuit concluded statutory rape was a crime of violence because Utah law recognizes rape as a crime of violence,
not because of the required elements of rape, which do not include physical force. Similarly, statutory rape would be considered a crime of violence under 18 USC § 16(b). The court also
concluded that because minors cannot legally consent to sexual
intercourse with an adult there is a substantial risk that physical force will be used in committing the offense of statutory rape.
"A common sense view of the sexual abuse statute, in combination with the legal determination that children are incapable of
consent, suggests ... there is always a substantial risk that
51
physical force will be used to ensure the child's compliance."
What distinguishes the Tenth Circuit's analysis is its strong reliance on the state court's construction of violent crimes. The court
determined that the state courts of Utah already recognize rape
and statutory rape as crimes of violence although physical force
52
is not a required element of either of the crimes.
In a case that summarizes the circuit split, the First Circuit
chose to follow the majority view with particular emphasis on the
Second Circuit's interpretation. In Aguiar v Gonzales,53 the court
decided the issue after seven other circuits had already addressed it. It considered the split that emerged among the circuits and the multiple starting points the circuits used to analyze
the issue. The court's reasoning for following the majority categorical approach was based on the fact that under the Rhode Island statute a victim cannot legally consent to the prohibited
conduct. 54 The court was called on to decide whether sexual penetration involving a person who is eighteen and a person who is
one day shy of sixteen involves a substantial risk of the use of
physical force. First the court addressed the fact that just because an offense creates a risk of physical injury and can be
characterized as a violent felony does not mean that the offense
49 13 F3d 377 (10th Cir 1993).
50 Id at 379.
51 Id.

52 Id. Consider Utah Code Ann § 76-5-402(1) (2006) ("A person commits rape when
the actor has sexual intercourse with another person without the victim's consent."); Utah
Code Ann § 76-5-404 (2006).
53 438 F3d 86 (1st Cir 2006).
54 RI Gen Laws § 11-37-6 (2006).
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necessarily involves a substantial risk of force. This underscored
the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in United States v Rodriguez, 55 noting whether the risk of harm results in actual harm is
irrelevant. The First Circuit then rejected the defendant's argument that factual consent was given even where legal consent
could not be. The court considered the reasoning of the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits but rejected it for three reasons. The court
first suggested that a distinction between factual and legal consent in this context would render the statute's assertion that a
person under the age of sixteen cannot consent meaningless.
Second, the court viewed this distinction as confusing a concern
for the "risk of force" with a concern for the "actual use of force."
Finally, the court believed that their conclusion, that statutory
rape falls under § 16(b) as a crime of violence, was reinforced by
the fact that the state statute did not criminalize all sexual conduct involving a person under-age (such as two minors having
sex). The court emphasized this point to suggest that the statute
is not in place to keep minors from making bad decisions. Instead
the court concluded "the plain motivation for the statute is the
risk that physical force may be used by the older perpetrator." 56
2. Inherent risk with young minors.
The Fifth Circuit in United States v Velasquez-Overa,57 explained that there is always the risk that physical force may be
used by a person of age on a minor when engaging in sexual intercourse because the minor lacks the ability to protect him or
herself. "A child has very few, if any, resources to deter the use of
physical force by an adult intent on touching the child. In such
circumstances, there is a significant likelihood that physical force
may be used to perpetrate the crime."5 8 The Fifth Circuit also
followed the categorical approach, explaining, "either a crime is
violent 'by its nature' or it is not."59 Using this reasoning the
court concluded that in any case where a person attempts to
have sex with a minor under the age of fourteen there is a substantial risk that force will be used to ensure the child's compli-

55 979 F2d 138, 141 (8th Cir 1992) (concluding that the court's "scrutiny ends upon a
finding that the risk of violence is present").
56 Aguiar, 438 F3d at 91.
57 100 F3d 418 (5th Cir 1996).
58 Id at 422.

59 Id at 420-21.
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ance. 60 The court did not provide much detail about the facts of
the case and neglected to mention whether the child involved in
this instance was under the age of fourteen. In this particular
case the defendant had previously been convicted on four sepa61
rate occasions of indecency with four different child victims.
The defendant had also previously been deported and returned to
the United States illegally. 62 Despite the lack of discussion of the
facts of the case, the Fifth Circuit held that crimes of this type
are generally perpetrated by adults who are not only bigger and
stronger than the children they abuse, but who also have the
ability to coerce these children, adding immensely to the danger63
ous circumstances under which this type of crime is committed.
The Fifth Circuit's assertion that crimes involving young
children are inherently violent has been adopted by other circuits
in similar context. Even courts that are not willing to recognize
statutory rape as an inherently violent crime are more willing to
call it violent in nature when the sexual act has been committed
with a very young child. For example, while the Ninth Circuit
has ruled that some instances of statutory rape are not crimes of
violence, 64 in United States v Wood,6 5 a case discussing the sentencing enhancement associated with a prior conviction for the
molestation of a four-year-old, the Ninth Circuit explained that
the "threat of violence is implicit in the size, age and author[itative] position of the adult in dealing with such a young
and helpless child."66 The court in Wood was deciding whether a
sentencing enhancement was appropriate due to a prior conviction under the Washington state law. The Unites States Sentencing Guidelines suggest a crime is violent when a serious risk of
physical injury to another is present. 67 This standard is different
from a § 16(b) analysis concluding a crime is violent if there is a
serous risk of physical force. Thus, although the Ninth Circuit in
Wood agrees with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, they are not ac-

60 Id.

61 Velasquez-Overa, 100 F3d at 419.
62 Id.
63 Id at 422 ("We think it obvious that such crimes typically occur in close quarters,
and are generally perpetrated by an adult upon a victim who is not only smaller, weaker,
and less experienced, but is also generally susceptible to acceding to the coercive power of
adult authority figures.").
64 Valencia, 439 F3d at 1052-53.
65 52 F3d 272 (9th Cir 1995).
66 Id at 274.

67 USSG § 4B1.2(1)(ii) (Nov 1993).
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tually deciding the issue in that case based on the § 16 (b) definition of crime of violence.
3. Full range of conduct.
In Valencia v Gonzales,68 the Ninth Circuit realized that it
would be "break[ing] new ground" as no previous case had decided the issue with a victim who was between the age of seventeen and eighteen. The Ninth Circuit used the categorical approach as laid out by the Supreme Court in Taylor v United
States.6 9 Conduct "qualifies as a crime of violence and hence as
an aggravated felony 'if and only if the full range of conduct covered by it falls within the meaning of that term."' 70 The court also
determined that 'the physical force' necessary to constitute a
crime of violence under 18 USC § 16(b) must be violent in nature."71 Using these two propositions the Ninth Circuit decided
that the "full range of conduct" covered under California statutory rape laws by its nature does not involve a substantial risk
72
that physical force will be used.
In reaching this conclusion, the court compared the charge of
statutory rape with that of sexual battery. 73 The crime of sexual
battery involves unlawful restraint and touching against the victim's will, 74 which by its nature "creat[es] a substantial risk of
resistance by the victim and the use of physical force by the perpetrator."75 In discussing statutory rape the court noted that
other circuits have taken a minor's inability to give legal consent
as a means for implying that the sexual intercourse that took
place is non-consensual. California law criminalizes sexual intercourse with a minor described as under eighteen or three years
younger than the perpetrator if the perpetrator is also under
eighteen. 76 The court recognized that California law prohibits
sexual intercourse with "minors" who are significantly older than
minors in other states. "In addition to this factual difference, we
68 439 F3d at 1046.

69 495 US 575 (1990).
70 Valencia, 439 at 1049, quoting United States v Baron-Medina, 187 F3d 1144, 1146
(9th Cir 1999).
71 Valencia v Gonzales, 439 F3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir 2006), citing Sareang Ye v INS,
214 F3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir 2000).
72 Valencia, 439 F3d at 1052-53.
73 Id at 1049.

74 Cal Penal Code § 243.4(a) (West 2006) (defining the crime of sexual battery).
75 Valencia, 439 F3d at 1049.
76 Cal Penal Code § 261.5 (b), (c).
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find the reasoning of the Second and Fifth Circuits somewhat
mechanical in equating a victim's legal incapacity to consent
77
with an actual unwillingness to be touched."
The court continued: "Therefore, while we agree that the
'non-consent of the victim' is the 'touchstone' for § 16(b) analysis,
it is the victim's actual non-consent that counts." 78 In Valencia,
the court considered the full range of the conduct proscribed by
Cal Penal Code section 261.5(c), including "consensual sexual
intercourse between a twenty-one-year-old and a minor one day
shy of eighteen ... fully capable of freely and voluntarily consenting to sexual relations."79 The court decided that the minor's
inability to give legal consent did not suggest that physical force
might be used in committing the offense.8 0
C.

Modified Categorical Approach

The Seventh Circuit, by contrast, held that statutory rape of
a fifteen-year-old is not categorically a crime of violence under
§ 16(b), and employed a modified categorical analysis.8 1 This
analysis considers the age of the victim, the age difference between the victim and perpetrator, and the nature of the sexual
activity.8 2 In Xiong v INS,8 3 as mentioned in the introduction, the
court decided that an eighteen-year-old alien who had factually
consensual sex with his fifteen-year-old girlfriend did not commit
a crime of violence because the conduct did not involve a substantial risk of the use of force.8 4 In this case an Immigration
Judge ("IJ") ruled that Xiong had committed a crime of violence
after Xiong admitted to having sex with his fifteen-year-old girlfriend and was sentenced to five years in prison. The IJ's order
was to have Xiong deported to Laos. The BIA dismissed Xiong's
appeal and entered a final deportation order. What was unique
about this case is that pursuant to the Illegal Immigration Re-

77 Valencia, 439 F3d at 1050.
78 Id at 1051 (emphasis omitted).
79 Id at 1052.
80 Id at 1055.

81 Xiong v INS, 173 F3d 601, 607 (7th Cir 1999).
82 Id. See also United States v Shannon, 110 F3d 382, 385 (7th Cir 1997) (en banc)
(rejecting the argument, in a case involving USSG § 4B1.2 that "any felonious sexual act
with a minor should be deemed []to involve force, because the minor is incapable of giving legally recognized consent").
83 173 F3d 601 (7th Cir 1999).
84 Id at 603, 607.
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form and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA")8 5 "when a final order of deportation is entered after October 30, 1996, 'there
shall be no appeal permitted in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable by reason of having committed ...an aggravated felony."'8 6 The court of appeals reviewed this case because the question of jurisdiction and the merits turned on
whether Xiong had committed an aggravated felony and a crime
87
of violence.
In Xiong the Seventh Circuit established that "[w]hen the
statutory definition of a criminal offense encompasses conduct
that does not constitute a crime of violence as well as conduct
that does," an IJ "may not simply categorize all conduct covered
by the offense as [a] crime of violence."8 8 The Seventh Circuit's
analysis looked to the individualized facts of Xiong's conviction to
make a determination. The court concluded that a simple and
permissible review of the undisputed facts already on the record
would have shown that Xiong's indictment did not permit a determination that his conduct "by its nature" involved a substantial risk of physical force.8 9 Xiong was decided in 1999 before the
Supreme Court decided Leocal. While the Supreme Court has not
spoken directly on statutory rape in the context of § 16(b) they
have said crime of violence status is not to be decided on the individualized facts of a petitioner's claim but by the nature of the
offense. 90 This invalidates the Seventh Circuit's modified categorical approach but does not prevent the court's conclusion that
statutory rape is not a crime of violence as will be discussed in
the evaluation of the case law section.

II. EVALUATION OF THE CASE LAW
This section will first address the problems that arise from
the majority circuits' overly cautious categorical approach. It will

85 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 309(c)(4),
Pub L No 104-208, codified at 8 USC § 1101.
86 Xiong, 173 F3d at 604, quoting 8 USC § 1101 (2000). See also id, quoting Yang v
INS, 109 F3d 1185, 1192 (7th Cir 1997) ("When judicial review depends on a particular
fact or legal conclusion, then a court may determine whether that condition exists.").
87 Id at 604.
88 Id at 605.

89 Compare Valencia v Gonzales, 439 F3d 1046, 1054 (9th Cir 2006) (Court declined
to take age of the perpetrator into account because it was not reflected in the charging
documents, noting that the court was confined to the records of the convicting court.).
90 Leocal v Ashcroft, 543 US 1,7 (2004).
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then discuss the benefits and shortcomings of the modified categorical approach, and finally suggest an alternative solution.
A.

Erring on the Side of Caution: Problems of the Majority
Categorical Approach

This section will examine some of the potential problems
with the majority circuit's analysis. It will address why the definition of statutory rape does not suggest there can be one consistent nature of the crime; why a minor's inability to give legal
consent should not serve as a proxy for determining whether a
risk of physical force exist; and why the reasons behind having
statutory rape laws do not lead to the conclusion that the laws
were designed to deter force from adult perpetrators.
1. One nature of the crime.
Finding a substantial risk that force will be used in all cases
of statutory rape equates the intrinsic nature of "rape" with that
of "statutory rape." Statutory rape is a strict liability crime. It
can be committed without the mens rea required of rape and
usually the statute defines the act of statutory rape differently
than that of rape. 91 Most rape statutes contain the phrase (or
something similar) "against the will of the victim." 92 Statutory
rape does not require that the sexual act happen against the will
of the victim only that the victim is not of age to make the informed decision to consent. Because of this, it has been acknowledged that statutory rape can happen without any risk or threatened use of force, as in Xiong.93 Aside from claiming that sexual
intercourse did not transpire there is no defense to statutory
rape. Because a strict liability crime can happen under so many
different circumstances, even accidentally or without knowledge,
it seems rash to say that all instances of statutory rape carry an
inherent risk of the use of physical force.
The majority circuits argue that the fact that § 16(b) alludes
to the "nature of the crime" requires that each crime be interpreted to have one consistent nature. But this is too narrow of a
view of statutory rape for two reasons. First, the differences in

91 See, for example, Fla Stat § 800.04(3) (West 2006) (noting that "the perpetrator's
ignorance of the victim's age, the victim's misrepresentation of his or her age, or the perpetrators bona fide belief of the victim's age cannot be raised as a defense").
92 See note 6.

93 Consider Xiong v INS, 173 F3d 601, 605 (7th Cir 1999).
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the scenarios contemplated in a single statutory rape law make
finding one nature of the crime a forced analysis. For example,
some statutory rape statutes are broad and diverse enough to
encompass a situation where a forty-two-year-old has sex with a
fourteen-year-old 94 as well as a situation where a twenty-oneyear-old has sex with a minor between the ages of seventeen and
eighteen. 95 The majority approach would not differentiate in its
treatment of these offenses. The controlling statutes make both
situations the same crime, yet the facts show that these are very
different situations and the nature of these offenses are in fact
different. In one instance you have a factually consensual sexual
relationship between a young adult and a minor about to reach
the age of majority. The other instance more easily demonstrates
a situation that the statute seeks to prevent: an older adult having sex with a young minor.
Secondly, although one of these situations is easier to pinpoint as undesirable, neither actually shows the offense carries
nor does not carry an inherent risk of physical force. Statutory
rape statutes do not require that any force be threatened or used
at all.96 In making the determination of whether the risk of force is
apparent, some courts, such as the Fifth Circuit in VelasquezOvera, have held that the person of age usually is much larger and
97
could overpower the minor if necessary to complete the crime.
While this may be true in some or most instances, it unfairly
treats the cases where these determinations of size and age are
clearly untrue (where the perpetrator and victim are equally situated in strength and/or close in age). The problem with finding one
nature of the crime is that it assumes the statute provides for a
98
unified nature of the offense and this is not always possible.
2. Creating a proxy for physical force.
The circuits that find the risk of violence inherent in statutory rape base their analysis on the fact that a minor, who is
94 Chery v Ashcroft, 347 F3d 404, 404 (2d Cir 2003). See also Conn Gen Stat Ann
§ 53a-71.
95 Cal Penal Code § 261.5.
96 See note 6.

97 United States v Velasquez-Overa, 100 F3d 418, 422 (5th Cir 1996) ("A child has
very few, if any, resources to deter the use of physical force by an adult intent on touching
the child. In such circumstances, there is a significant likelihood that physical force may
be used to perpetuate the crime.").
98 Xiong, 173 F3d at 605 (noting that a criminal offense can encompasses conduct
that does not constitute a crime of violence as well as conduct that does).
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supposed to be protected by the statute, cannot legally give consent. The inability to give consent, however, is not directly related to a risk of physical force being used against the minor. 99
When statutory rape occurs, sexual contact has been illegally
imposed, but this does not mean it was physically forced or that a
substantial risk of force is apparent. In the majority of cases the
courts have taken consent (a minor's inability to give it) as a
proxy for risk of physical force. For example, the First Circuit in
Aguiar states,
[a] common sense view of the sexual abuse statute, in
combination with the legal determination that children
are incapable of consent, suggests that when a [person at
least eighteen] attempts to sexually [penetrate] a child
[between the ages of fourteen and sixteen], there will always be a substantial risk that physical force will be
used.100
When ignoring the particular circumstances of an event one
can see why this proxy is sensible. The courts may be naturally
following a line of reasoning that says if consent is not given then
non-consent was expressed; taken a step further, non-consent is
equated with protest.
While this line of reasoning is easy enough to follow, it
proves factually untrue in many instances of statutory rape. The
inability to consent does not mean that a minor always protests;
it simply means the state does not recognize the minor's ability
to act on his or her own behalf. This legal fiction 1° ' creates a gray
area between consent and non-consent that only the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits have been willing to address. 10 2 To determine
what to do in this gray area the Ninth circuit took into account
all acts that could be committed under the statute before deciding if they all inherently posed a risk of physical force. The Seventh Circuit looked to the facts of the case at hand to decide
whether the individual crime posed a risk of physical force. The
99 See Valencia v Gonzales, 439 F3d 1046, 1046 (9th Cir 2006).
100 438 F3d at 91, quoting Reyes-Castro, 13 F3d at 379.
11 Aguiar v Gonzales, 438 F3d 86, 91 n 9 (1st Cir 2006) (noting that it may be unfair
to deport a person for an act committed while they are young and under circumstances
that amount to a legal fiction but that this determination was left to the Rhode Island
legislature).
102 See United States v Kozminski, 487 US 931, 967 n 1 (1988) (Stevens concurring)
(stating questions concerning a victim's age and vulnerability are best resolved on a caseby-case basis because an unambiguous legal rule produces much uncertainty).
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minority circuits decided that when the variance in age of the
perpetrator and victim is close, and factual consent is present,
the minor's inability to consent demonstrates little to nothing
about the risk of physical force being used.
Categorically saying that a risk of physical force is inherent
in statutory rape is the more sweeping way to penalize the offense. Being over-inclusive on this matter may seem desirable
when dealing with the deportation of immigrants who have not
respected the laws of this nation and who have shown themselves to possibly be a threat to society. Yet, treating all statutory rape offenses in this manner ignores the meaningful variations that exist between cases.
3. Why we have statutory rape laws.
The First Circuit in Aguiar suggested that by not criminalizing situations where minors have sex with each other the statute
stands to protect minors against force that might be used by an
adult as opposed to protecting them generally from making bad
decisions. 10 3 A historical analysis of why statutory rape laws
were implemented will help in examining the court's analysis.
Statutory rape laws were originally part of the common law
America adopted from England. 10 4 The age of consent was initially ten, but was gradually raised by individual states to eighteen and in some states twenty-one. 10 5 Although great disparity
still exists, the age of consent in statutory rape laws today
ranges from fourteen to eighteen. 10 6 Originally the laws were
gender specific, only criminalizing sexual acts with female victims. This has lead many commentators to believe the primary
motivation for criminalizing the behavior was to promote female

103 Aguiar v Gonzales, 438 F3d 86, 91 n 8 (1st Cir 2006).

104 See Rita Eidson, Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27
UCLA L Rev 757, 762 (1980), citing the Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw 1, ch 13
(Eng).
105 Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 Tex L
Rev 387, 402-06 (1984) (analyzing the history of statutory rape laws and the feminist
critique of such laws).
106 See, for example, Ark Code Ann § 5-14-103(3)(A) (2006) (setting the age of consent
at fourteen); Cal Penal Code § 261.5(a) (West 2000) (defining a minor as a person under
the age of eighteen); Idaho Code Ann § 18-6101 (2006) (defining rape as sexual intercourse "[wihere the female is under the age of eighteen (18) years"). Consider Catherine
L. Carpenter, The Constitutionalityof Strict Liability in Sex Offender Registration, 86 BU
L Rev 295, 311-12 (2006) (highlighting "the disparity of legislative thought as to the
appropriate age of consent" between the states).
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07
chastity and prevent teenage out-of-wedlock pregnancies.
Some commentators suggest other social policy reasons for outlawing sex with minors such as "social disapproval of certain
08
forms of exploitation," and preserving the innocence of youth.
In State v Munz, l0 9 the court asserted "venereal disease, damage
to reproductive organs, the lack of considered consent, heightened vulnerability to physical and psychological harm, [and] lack
of mature judgment" as additional reasons for the state's interests in managing the welfare of minors. 1' 0 Despite the underlying
historical purpose of creating statutory rape laws, all but one
state have adopted gender neutral language."'
Another evolution in the law of statutory rape that commentators have noticed is the decriminalization of peer-on-peer underage sex. 1 2 Whether this is because more Americans report
having their first sexual experiences as minors, or because of the
"dawning recognition that the threat of criminal prosecution was

107 Carpenter, 86 BU L Rev at 309 (cited in note 106) (noting that statutory rape laws
seek to prevent unwanted pregnancies and the physical and emotional trauma associated
with early sexual activity); Joe Stennis, Equal Protection Dilemma: Why Male Adolescent
Students Need Federal Protection From Adult Female Teachers Who Prey on Them, 35 J L
& Educ 395, 398 (2006) (recognizing the states' interests to deter such acts as statutory
rape, and prevent female victims from having a child out of wedlock as legitimate reasons
to impose severe punishment on male offenders); Maribel Morey, Note, The Civil Commitment of State-Dependent Minors: Resonating Discourse That Leave Her Heterosexuality and His Homosexuality Vulnerable to Scrutiny, 81 NYU L Rev 2129, 2148 (2006),
quoting Michelle Oberman, Girls in the Master's House: Of Protection, Patriarchyand the
Potentialfor Using the Master's Tool to Reconfigure Statutory Rape Law, 50 DePaul L Rev
799, 806 (2000) ("[The] purpose of these laws is to combat teen pregnancy and out-ofwedlock births."); Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls Into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern
Statutory Rape Law, 85 J Crim L & Criminol 15, 25 (1994) (emphasizing sex-specific
classifications were used to promote the state's interest in preventing teen pregnancies);
Michael M., 450 US 464, 476 (1981) (concluding that a California statute making only
males criminally liable for statutory rape reasonably reflects the fact that the consequences of sexual intercourse fall more heavily on females).
108 See Olsen, 63 Tex L Rev at 401 (cited in note 105); Carpenter, 86 BU L Rev at 309
(cited in note 106) ("Statutory rape is an anomaly[, h]istorically devised to protect the
innocence of youth ....
").
109 355 NW 2d 576 (Iowa 1984).
110 Id at 585.
ill See Carpenter, 86 BU L Rev at 313 (cited in note 106). Carpenter discusses the
Idaho Code, which defines statutory rape "as the penetration, however slight, of the oral,
anal or vaginal opening with the perpetrator's penis accomplished with a female." Idaho
Code Ann § 18-6101 (2006). But see Eidson, 27 UCLA L Rev at 761 (cited in note 104)
("The preferred rationale for protecting only females and punishing only males has
evolved from early exaltation of female chastity and the special need to protect the
'weaker sex' to more recent arguments that gender-based statutory rape laws are appropriate because of the unique physical characteristics of females.") (citations omitted).
112 See Carpenter, 86 BU L Rev at 313 (cited in note 106) (stating that the recent
decriminalization of peer-on-peer underage sexual activity has reshaped the contours of
statutory rape).
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not a realistic deterrent to peer-on-peer high school sexual activity" is unknown. 113 Many states have lowered or eliminated penalties associated with peer-on-peer statutory rape. Statutory
rape statutes may not criminalize sex between two minors because it would be difficult to decide who was the perpetrator and
who was the victim. It would be presumptuous to suggest that in
every circumstance the male pressured the female even if the
consequences lie more heavily with the female participant. In an
instance where both actors are minors there is no equitable way
to chastise one minor's judgment without holding him or her to a
higher standard than the other. The First Circuit's analysis
overreaches in concluding that the elimination of one type of
sexual act (peer-on-peer) from the statute suggests that the statute is most concerned with protecting minors from the physical
force of adults. Other reasons that are arguably equally salient
remain for keeping statutory rape in effect, such as preventing
the exploitation of minors at the hands of adults.
B.

Pros and Cons of the Modified Categorical Approach

The most notable benefit of the modified categorical approach is its willingness to look at the facts of an individual's
case before determining the nature of the individual's offense. In
contrast to the categorical approach, this gives courts the opportunity to consider the circumstances and each defendant as an
individual. This is not possible when courts lump substantively
different situations together. In essence, this approach promotes
the notion that each case should be tried on the facts. The modified categorical approach suggests that each statutory rape case
must be analyzed individually to determine if it was a crime of
violence. While this fact-based approach may carry the burden of
more administrative costs, it would provide each defendant with
an application of the law to the circumstances under which the
defendant was acting. This would prevent ludicrous outcomes
such as an eighteen-year-old being eligible for deportation for
having sex with his sixteen- or seventeen-year-old girlfriend.
In attempting to decide each case on its own facts, the factbased approach is susceptible to wildly different outcomes given
similar situations. The use of judicial discretion will open the
door to abuse of the criminal justice system and, in attempting to
achieve fairness for each individual, could actually have the op113 Id.
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posite effect. While this concern is legitimate, the question boils
down to which approach presents more bias and potential for
unfair implementation. This is answered largely by what one
believes about judicial discretion and the ability of judges to analyze facts consistently and objectively. It is possible that in exercising discretion each judge could decide each case "correctly"
and in the best interests of all parties involved as well as society.
There are legal situations where we allow for judicial discretion
through the use of standards because we value the individualized
attention and expertise the judges can provide. Standards are
used to assess issues ranging from child custody disputes to the
114
fair use practices of copyright law.
Statutory rape presents a unique problem that is not present
in other strict liability offenses. For example, the traffic violation
of speeding is a strict liability crime. As a rule, if one is caught
speeding an officer issues a ticket and usually does not care
about individual circumstances because promoting the safety of
the road is the primary objective. While an analogy to statutory
rape can be made, it is lacking because statutory rape is a strict
liability offense that one can commit without knowing it. The
comparison is also flawed because statutory rape carries an additional stigma and in some jurisdictions the perpetrator must register as a sex offender. 115 In addition, statutory rape generally
carries a higher penalty than other strict liability crimes. 11 6 For
example, Iowa's statutory rape statute requires a minimum punishment of five years imprisonment and the maximum penalty is
life. 117 In California, the crime can be charged as a misdemeanor
or a felony. 118 The discretion that has already been placed in the
114 Consider Lauren R. Calia, Jael E. Polnac, and Samantha Rosenberg, Survey, Family Law, 52 Md L Rev 718, 728 (1993) (discussing the use of standards in child support
cases); 17 USC § 107 (2006) (statute explaining the factors to be considered in deciding
the issue of fair use in copyright law).
115 Consider Michelle R. Vanyo, Maryland Survey: 1998-1999: Recent Decisions, 59
Md L Rev 860, 881 (2000) (noting the stigma of criminal conviction and moral blame
associated with statutory rape); Britton Guerrina, Comment, Mitigating Punishment for
Statutory Rape, 65 U Chi L Rev 1251, 1270 (1998) (arguing against mitigating social
stigma attached to having sex with young girls because it will reinforce undesirable social
messages).
116 Cal Bus & Prof Code § 25658 (2006) (states that sell alcohol to a person under the
age of twenty-one is a misdemeanor; a perpetrator may be fined $250 or subject to
twenty-four to thirty-two hours of community service with higher penalties for subsequent violations). Consider Cal Veh Code § 22350 (2006) (Fines are assessed for speeding
violations.); Cal Veh Code § 13352 (2006) (DUI convictions result in a suspension of the
perpetrator's license for at least 6 months.).
117 Iowa Code § 709.4 (2006) (Sexual abuse in the third degree is a class "C" felony.).
118 Cal Penal Code §261.5(a)-(c) (West 2000).
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hands of states to penalize statutory rape in such divergent fashions bolsters the position that judges should be allowed to use
discretion in deciding these cases in an attempt to balance or
offset inter-state inconsistencies. In the immigration law context
such large differences in sentencing and level of offense impact
whether an immigrant is deported or not-something that arguably should be consistent across state lines.
In a related analysis, Julie Anne Rah discusses the inconsistencies of immigration law with respect to Felony DWI charges.
She comments on how lack of uniformity in the law presents an
unfair standard for immigrants to live up to."19 While giving discretion to judges has the potential to be abused, it also provides
them with room to maneuver in instances where a blanket rule
would provide an unjust outcome.
While the modified categorical approach's willingness to look
to individualized facts is tempting, it cannot be reconciled with
the Supreme Court's analysis in Leocal. The court in Leocal said
that the language of § 16(b) "requires us to look to the elements
and the nature of the offense of conviction, rather than to the
particular facts relating to petitioner's crime.' 120 For this reason
this analysis should not be followed. Although the Seventh Circuit's reasoning is preempted by the Supreme Court's directive
that a § 16(b) analysis looks to the nature of the offense, the Seventh Circuit's conclusion is not completely barred. If looking at
one specific set of facts (such as those in Xiong) encompassed in
the definition of statutory rape does not rise to the level of a
crime of violence then the offense is not inherently a violent one.
If the courts truly do look to the nature of all behavior implied by
statute, they will find that statutory rape statutes are generally
too broad to present honestly a substantial risk that physical
force will be used. When the statute requires neither intent to
commit the act nor protest from the victim, no risk of any particular type of behavior is inherent in the crime.
C.

An Alternative Approach

Proponents of the majority's categorical analysis may suggest that a rule getting rid of anyone who does not follow the law
exactly is a cautious and desirable approach because the offense
119 Julie Anne Rah, Note, The Removal of Aliens Who Drink and Drive: Felony DWI as
a Crime of Violence Under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), 70 Fordham L Rev 2109, 2111 (2002) (noting
circuit split with respect to felony DWI constituting a crime of violence).
120 Leocal v Ashcroft, 543 US 1, 6 (2004).
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of statutory rape is a serious one. While this is true it is important to remember that statutory rape has the potential to carry
an extra penalty for immigrants whether they knowingly engage
in the conduct or not: deportation. If statutory rape laws are in
place to deter such behavior one should have to know that one is
committing the offense. If criminal punishment is to automatically follow the crime of statutory rape we should remember that
immigrants face the possibility of overpaying by additionally losing their legal status in the United States. Because of this
heightened penalty, perhaps their cases deserve cautious analysis. One way to address both issues-(1) whether statutory rape
occurred; and (2) whether it was a crime of violence-is to truly
address the issues independently, paying particularly close attention to the controlling statute for each issue.
Whether statutory rape occurred is a question that can be
answered in any state simply by noting the age of the alleged
victim and perpetrator. If it is determined that an immigrant has
violated the statute, he or she should receive the same punishment a citizen would receive.
Whether a crime of violence has occurred requires careful
analysis of § 16(b). It is important to keep in mind the reason the
courts have been referred to 18 USC § 16 for a definition of crime
of violence. Title 18 USC § 16(b) was enacted as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. There is legislative history that suggests the INA incorporates this provision for a definition of "crime of violence" to provide a mechanism to rid the
United States of immigrants who have proven they pose a violent
threat to society.121
The Supreme Court's mandate in Leocal was that § 16(b)
analysis requires looking to the elements and nature of the crime
rather than to the individual facts. 122 The Ninth Circuit is the
only circuit that effectively did this. In Valencia the court looked
to the full range of conduct possible under the controlling statute. In doing so they noticed situations that did not suggests an
inherent risk of physical force might be used to perpetrate the
act and thus did not find statutory rape to be a § 16(b) crime of
violence. 123 The other circuits employing categorical analysis do
121 See Rah, 70 Fordham L Rev at 2116 (cited in note 119) (highlighting Congress's
dramatic expansion of crimes that could result in deportation after immigration and
crime levels began rising in the 1980s).
122 Leocal, 543 US at 7.
123 Valencia v Gonzales, 439 F3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir 2006).
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not purport to have taken into consideration all of the elements
and possible natures of the crime when deciding if the risk of
force was present. The Fifth Circuit claims that a crime cannot
encompass violent and non-violent offenses. 124 The Eleventh Circuit recognized that a violation of the statute may exist without
physical force but still categorically says that the risk of physical
force is present in the crime. 125 The Second circuit claims "cases
can be imagined where a defendant's conduct does not create a
genuine probability that force will be used, but the risk of force
remains inherent in the offense."'1 26 To say that it is possible to
commit a crime without the risk of physical force but then insist
that the risk of physical force is an inherent element of that
crime is contradictory. Implying that a categorical analysis of the
crime suggests such an outcome is a misuse of the words "inher127
ent" and "categorical."'
The majority of courts that use the inherent risk analysis
would most likely analogize the risk of physical force being used
in the crime of statutory rape to that of burglary as the Supreme
Court discussed in Leocal. This comparison is not appropriate
because the crime of burglary requires a specific intent whereas
statutory rape does not. When one intends to burglarize, he or
she is aware that force may be necessary to commit the crime of
breaking into the dwelling of another with the intent to commit a
crime therein. 128 On the other hand, when one commits statutory
rape, as the Ninth Circuit noted in Valencia, there may be no
risk of physical force if the act is being done with the factual consent of the minor. 129 The Supreme Court said in Leocal that the
focus should be on whether the risk of physical force is inherent
130
in the crime, not on whether injury will result from the crime.

124 United States v Velasquez-Overa, 100 F3d 418, 420-21 (5th Cir 1996) ("[E]ither a
crime is violent 'by its nature' or not.").
125 Ramsey v INS, 55 F3d 580, 583 (iith Cir 1995) ("Although a violation of [the statute] might be accomplished without the use of physical force, we conclude that the offense
is a felony which involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used against the
victim in the course of committing the offense.").
126 Chery v Ashcroft, 347 F3d 404, 408 (2d Cir 2003) (noting example of seventeenyear-old male having consensual sex with fifteen-year-old girlfriend does not pose a risk
of actual force but is still in violation of Connecticut statute).
127 Webster's Third InternationalDictionary 352, 1163 (1986) (defining categorical as:
"absolute, unqualified" and inherent as: "involved in the constitution or essential character of something: belonging by nature or habit: intrinsic").
128 Consider Model Pen Code §221.1.
129 See Valencia, 439 F3d at 1053.
130 Leocal, 543 US at 10.
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While it is somewhat easier to argue that there is a risk of
injury to a minor when an adult has sexual intercourse with her,
the court suggests risk of injury is distinguishable from the use
of physical force. We cannot say that physical force will never be
used when committing statutory rape, but we should be hesitant
to conclude that the crime, as defined by statute, involves a substantial risk of physical force, just as the Supreme Court recognized that the crime of driving while under the influence does
not inherently run the risk of involving physical force.
A critical point of analysis employed by both the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits would establish a line of reasoning that simplifies the court's duty as well as holds them to the standard provided in Leocal. The Seventh Circuit asks the question of
whether the statute encompasses conduct that does and does not
constitute a crime of violence. 131 If the statute encompasses both
types of conduct then a categorical analysis would suggest that
the crime could not inherently present a risk that physical force
might be used. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit's analysis takes into
consideration the full range of conduct possible under the statute. If any conduct within that range does not create an inherent
risk of physical force, then categorical analysis suggests the statute does not categorically define a crime of violence. As summarized by the majority circuits' explanations above there is often
some behavior criminalized by statue that does not present a risk
of physical force. Although it may seem odd to have to consider
conduct that has not happened in the particular case at hand,
but that could possibly happen within the definition of the statutory rape statue, this step is required in deciding whether the
nature of the crime has as an element the substantial risk of
physical force.
Utilizing these portions of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits'
analysis will not change the position of all of the majority courts,
it will simply unify the standard to which the crime of statutory
rape is held. It would probably penalize (by deportation) statutory rape where the statute specifies that the age of the perpetrator is well above that of the victim (in other words where the
full range of conduct specified by statute presents a risk of physical force being used). The analysis would probably not lead to
deportation where the statute encompasses a wide range of acts.
For example, in Valencia, a forty-two-year-old was not held to be
131 Xiong v INS, 173 F3d 601, 607 (7th Cir 1999). See also United States v Shannon,
110 F3d 382, 387 (7th Cir 1997) (en banc).
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a violent felon under § 16(b)'s definition of crime of violence because the California statute 132 encompasses conduct where a
twenty-one-year-old can be charged with statutory rape for having sex with a seventeen-year-old. 133 In that situation the court
concluded that persons seventeen years of age can factually consent, meaning that not all circumstances would present a risk of
physical force. This analysis may seem too sweeping in the opposite direction of the majority categorical approach, but because of
what is at stake once it has been decided someone has committed
a crime of violence the more cautious approach in handing out
this label is warranted.
CONCLUSION
Statutory rape is a serious offense, but this does not automatically qualify it as a crime of violence as defined by federal
law. 134 This comment seeks to shed light on the intention of the
INA when it references § 16(b). An argument of statutory interpretation could be made on either side of this issue. The statute
could be read strictly, paying particular attention to punctuation.
The phrase could also be read in light of the overall meaning of
the statute, or to uphold congressional intent. This comment
chooses to follow the latter approach in an attempt to provide
immigration law with a standard that is workable as well as equitable in light of the congressional intent behind § 16(b) and the
Supreme Court's previous rulings regarding other § 16(b) crimes
of violence.
The categorical analysis applied by the majority circuits
seeks to find an easy answer to a difficult and complicated question. It lumps all statutory rape offenses together by hiding behind the § 16(b) phrase "by its nature" without considering the
entire nature of the statutory offense. This approach could potentially over-penalize some persons guilty of statutory rape. The
courts should employ the categorical approach but in doing so
should follow the Ninth Circuit, taking into consideration the full
range of conduct contemplated by the statute.

132 Cal Penal Code § 261.5.
133 Valencia, 439 F3d at 1052.
134 See 18 USC § 16.

